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Boyle: Symposium: The Guatemala Protocol

THE GUATEMALA PROTOCOL
ROBERT

P. BOYLE*

W

EN I AM ASKED to talk about the Warsaw Convention and the
Guatemala Protocol, I look forward to it with some anticipation.
However, when I discovered that I had Ian McPherson on one side
of me, and Lee Kreindler on the other, I felt like a quarterback faced
with third and three. He doesn't know whether to run or pass, and
that's exactly how I feel.
The Warsaw Convention' is an international treaty which acts to
limit the liability of the airlines to passengers. In return, it is intended
to make it easier for the passenger to recover from the airlines should
he be injured or killed in an accident, by requiring the airlines to prove
that it took all necessary measures to avoid the damage. This treaty was
drawn up in the infancy of aviation, 1929 to be precise. It was primarily
the creation of the European nations. They envisioned it as a means to
stabilize the law applicable to international flights, which might otherwise
be subject to diverse treatment in the different countries which an airplane
in Europe could easily over-fly. It contains many rules other than those on
liability, which directly affects the relationship of the airline to its
passengers and its shippers. The United States adhered to this treaty in
1934, at which time the limit of liability of the airline to the passenger
was $8,300. The limit of liability of the airline to its shipper was $7.50
per pound for its cargo.
The convention worked reasonably well when aviation was an infant;
however, after World War II when aviation grew up, particularly with the
significant increase in the number of persons flying, and generally the
increase in the world standard of living, $8,300 became simply too
low. Consequently, in the late 1940's and early 1950's the United States
undertook a program to try and achieve an increase in this limit.
The story of the 1971 revision of the Warsaw Convention which
is contained in the Guatemala Protocol, begins with denunciation by
the United States of the Warsaw Convention in November of 1965.
The United States was motivated in taking that action at that time
by a number of circumstances.
* B.A., Williams College; L.L.B., Harvard Law School. Mr. Boyle has served as
General Counsel for the Civil Aeronautics Administration, Deputy Assistant Administrator for International Aviation Affairs, Federal Aviation Agency, and has also
served as the United States Representative to the Council of ICAO. Mr. Boyle is
presently an International Aviation Consultant to the Department of Transportation.
'Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, opened for signature October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876 (1934)
[hereinafter references to specific provisions of the convention will be: The Warsaw
Convention, Art....... ].
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First, as I have already said, the limit of liability contained in the
Warsaw Convention of $8,300 was completely inadequate and even with
the proposed amendment of the Hague Protocol (a protocol drawn up in
1955) to a limit of $16,600, the amount still fell far short of the needs
of the American public. 2 The government had tried to supplement this
totally inadequate figure by suggesting legislation which would have
provided an additional $50,000 in insurance to all United States citizens
traveling to and from the United States on United States airlines, and
international air transportation. If this legislative proposal had been
accepted it would have permitted recovery, assuming United States ratification of the Hague Protocol, in the amount of approximately $66,600;
however, the proposal drew so much opposition from the airlines, the
insurance companies and others, that it did not even get a hearing in
3
the Congress.
Faced with this failure, the government then tried to get a voluntary
agreement, permissible under Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention, from
the United States' airlines, under which the carriers would increase4
their liability limit to $100,000 per passenger. This effort also failed.
The United States was thus left in a dilemma. It had concluded that the
limited liability in the Warsaw Convention of $8,300 was not in
the public interest, and its efforts to correct this deficiency by purely
domestic actions were unsuccessful.
In looking at the prospect of early international action to secure a
substantial upward revision of the limit, the prognosis was equally
unfavorable. Consequently, even though the government was extremely
reluctant to withdraw from a multilateral international agreement of
widespread application, which with the exception of the limits of liability
had worked well in providing a regime of a law under which international
air transportation had flourished, there seemed to be no viable alternative,
and so, the United States filed a denunciation of the Warsaw Convention.
This action precipitated international action, particularly within the
International Civil Aviation Organization. 5 ICAO convened in early 1966
a special meeting for the purpose of considering ways and means of
coping with the problem of increasing the limit of liability for passengers
under the Warsaw Convention. The United States participated in this
meeting and, in fact, the meeting developed into a dialogue between
the United States, on one side, and practically all the other countries
of the world on the other.

2 Senate Exec. H. 86th Cong., 1st Sess; Doc. 7632, Int'l Civil Aviation Org. 1955.
3 See Stephen, The Adequate Award in International Aviation Accidents, INS. L.J.

720 (1966).
4Id. at 722.
5 Hereinafter cited as ICAO.
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As Vice Chairman of the U.S. Delegation I can assure you that it
was not a pleasant meeting. The action of the United States in denouncing
Warsaw was regarded by some as far too precipite and, in fact, taken in
an effort to force upward revision of the Warsaw Convention limits by the
international community. At this meeting, the United States proposed
the limit be increased to $100,000 per passenger, but we found almost
universal opposition to this proposal. There were a number of other
suggestions advanced by other delegations, but none of those receiving
majority approval were acceptable to us. One which would have combined
a per-passenger limit of $75,000 with a concept of absolute liability on
the part of the airlines might have been acceptable to the United States
if a substantial majority could have been persuaded to favor it. However,
for procedural and other reasons, this majority never materialized.
Thus, the meeting ended unsuccessfully and the denunciation of the
Warsaw Convention, which would take effect in six months, stood. At
the last moment, the International Air Transport Association 6 presented
to the United States a proposal under which all of the major air carriers
serving the United States voluntarily agreed to increase their limit of
liability on flights to, from, and through, the United States to $75,000,
and to accept the principle of absolute liability.7 The story of this effort is
set forth in length by its principal architect, Sir William Hildred, who was
then Director General of the International Air Transport Association.8
This proposal met the principal concerns of the United States. It
increased the limit of liability, and it offered a prospect of quicker
settlements with a minimum of litigation, due to the acceptance of the
concept of absolute liability. It was accompanied by a general indication
by the major countries of the world that they would be willing to work
through ICAO for a permanent revision of the Warsaw Convention,
rather than the interim solution which was offered by the private
agreement sponsored by IATA.
The United States government was thus faced with the problem
of determining what kind of a permanent arrangement for the Warsaw
Convention it could accept as being in the public interest. With the
Department of Transportation assuming chairmanship, a special committee
began a study of this problem. 9 After a lengthy deliberation within the
government, including extensive consultation with the aviation industry,
6

Hereinafter cited as IATA.

7CAB Order No. B-23680 (May 18, 1966), 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
8 Hildred, Air Carriers' Liability: Significance of The Warsaw Convention and Events
Leading Up To The Montreal Agreement, 33 JOURNAL OF Am LAW AND COMMERCE

521 (1967).
9 This was an ad hoc group of the Interagency Group on International Aviation which
was created by Presidential memorandum to resolve policy issues in the field of

international aviation affecting more than one agency of Government.
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and the legal profession (including both the academic and the active bar)
a United States position was agreed upon. The essence of this position, as
was stated by the Chief of the United States delegation at a meeting
of the Legal Committee of the ICAO, was that to meet the test of
public interest a revised convention should achieve three basic objectives:
certainty of recovery, speed of recovery, and sufficiency of recovery.
To obtain certainty of recovery, we proposed absolute liability, with
no defense except that of contributory negligence. To assure speed of
recovery, we proposed a settlement inducement provision that would
empower courts to award over and above any limit ultimately established,
all legal expenses incurred by claimants, including legal fees, unless a
timely and adequate offer of settlement was made with the carrier. In
addition, the United States proposed that the fora available to claimants
for suit be enlarged to include the forum of the state of domicile of
permanent residence of the claimant, if the defendant had a place of
business in, and was otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of that state. To
assure sufficiency of recovery, we recommended a limit of $125,000, with
a provision for periodic and automatic upward revision of that limit to
take account of changing world economic conditions.
During the course of the debate of this proposal in the Legal
Committee of ICAO it became evident that the level of $125,000 was
unacceptable to a majority of the other governments, and the United
States delegation reluctantly agreed to a level of $100,000.
In agreeing to accept this lower level, coupled of course with
periodic and automatic upward adjustment, we relied upon a survey
undertaken by the Civil Aeronautics Board. The subject matter of this
survey was death settlements and judgments in non-Warsaw Convention
cases in the United States for the period of 1958 through 1967.10
The subcommittee took no definite action on this particular proposal,
but they did refer it to the full Legal Committee of ICAO for further
work, and a meeting on that was held in 1970.11 The ultimate outcome
was to recommend a revision of the Warsaw Convention which met in all
substantial respects the requirements of the United States. It called for
absolute liability of the airline to the passenger with no defenses available
to the airline, except that of contributory negligence. In addition, it
included a limit of liability of $100,000. Furthermore, it added a
provision which had not been supported by the United States. This
provided that the limit would be unbreakable in all cases, even in the case
of gross negligence, or wilful misconduct.12 It included the settlement

10 ICAO

Legal Committee Meeting, Sept. 1969, LC/SC Warsaw WD 30.
"Legal Committee of ICAO, 17 Sess. Feb.-Mar., Doc. 8878-LC 161-162 (1970).
12ICAO Doc. 8878-LC 162 at 24.
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inducement clause to which I referred. It called for automatic and
periodic revision of the limit. It included the additional forum, and finally
provided for a revision of ticketing requirements to make it clear that
ticketing failures would not automatically break the limit.'3
With approval from the legal committee, ICAO convened a
diplomatic conference. In preparation for this conference, the United
States undertook a new survey of recoveries in non-Warsaw Convention
aviation accident cases, of both judgments and settlements. The new data
included cases through the first part of 1970. On the basis of that data, we
came quickly to the conclusion that the $100,000 that we had previously
accepted was now inadequate. In fact, the new statistics indicated that in
order to provide full recovery for the great majority of the passengers, a
limit on the order of $300,000 was required. The United States notified
ICAO of this as soon as we ascertained this fact. Furthermore, we
indicated in our notification that we would try to find some way of
providing additional compensation, and would hope to submit a proposal
dealing with this matter at the Diplomatic Conference. It was this
proposal at the Diplomatic Conference which ultimately became Article
35(A) of the Guatemala Protocol,' 4 under which any country may
provide a system to supplement the compensation awarded under the
Guatemala Protocol as long as that system meets certain tests that
are set forth in said article.
The United States proposal caused a great deal of controversy, not
to say consternation, at the Diplomatic Conference. The countries of
the world had every reason to believe that as a result of the Legal
Committee deliberations a revised Warsaw Convention with a $100,000
limit would be acceptable to the United States. Our proposal for more
almost broke up the conference; however, after many days of
negotiation, we signed the convention, and thereafter set out almost
immediately to work out the development of a supplemental system.
After some deliberation we decided to explore, at least initially, the
feasibility of doing this by interline agreement among the airlines
subject to approval by the Civil Aeronautics Board, under section 412
of the Federal Aviation Act.15 This is very much like the existing
Montreal Agreement, 16 which does provide on a voluntary basis the
$75,000 limit with an absolute liability regime.
The basic concept of the supplemental compensation plan, which is
envisioned in the draft agreement that is currently in circulation,
13 Id. at 25.
14 International Conference on Air Law, W/H Doc. 3, 25, Guatemala City, Feb.-Mar.
(1971).
1549 U.S.C. § 1382.
16 Agreement CAB 18990, approved by order E-23680, May 18, 1966 (Doc. 17325).
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is relatively simple. It proposes that a charge be levied by the seller on
any airline tickets sold within the United States calling for international
air transportation. The funds derived from these charges will be turned
over to a contractor who will be responsible for the administration,
operation, and integrity of the fund. The fund would be used to pay
all those provable compensatory damages established by any claimant
which exceeded the limit prescribed by the convention. Itis recognized
that the fund in its initial years will probably not be sufficient to meet
claims made against it. For this reason, the draft agreement calls for
the contractor to agree to accept the obligation to pay the maximum
amount that is agreed upon in the plan. Obviously, since this can mean
that the contractor may have to provide additional funds from his own
resources, or by obtaining insurance, it provides that he may recoup such
advances, including the cost of insurance, from the fund as it acquires
additional revenue. The agreement calls for the establishment of this fund
as one for the benefit of the passengers, in which neither the contractor
nor the carriers have any property right, and for which both are required
to render full accounting. At the moment, the unresolved central issues
are the extent of the additional coverage which can be provided for
passengers by this fund and at what price. We are hopeful that the
additional charge per ticket would be modest, perhaps less than $2.
One of the major provisions of the plan is that it contemplates that of
the total sum collected, 90% to 95% will be available for the payment
of claims. This means of course that the expense of administration and of
additional insurance must be kept at a very low level. The Government
believes this is possible. Furthermore, the plan contemplates that at least
annually the Civil Aeronautics Board will review results under the plan. If
it appears that the plan is accumulating more funds than it needs to pay off
current claims, and still maintain an appropriate reserve, the Board will
either increase the benefits or decrease the charge. Correspondingly, if the
fund appears inadequate to pay claims, the Board in turn will decrease the
benefit or increase the charge. One of the obvious advantages of the private plan versus other arrangements, such as the establishment of a scheme
of legislation, is the flexibility that this kind of annual review provides.
The plan has been made available to interested organizations for
their consideration in determining whether or not they wish to submit
a proposal for its operation. The initial meetings with the United States
airlines were held in September, and at that time we indicated that we
would like to have an indication by the 15th of November, 1972, of their
interest. To date, we have had indications from at least two organizations
of their intention to submit formal proposals for the operation of this plan.
Both of these are from responsible organizations. We anticipate further
discussion with them to review and explore their formal proposals.
What I have set forth is a very brief review of the events which led
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up to the proposal for a supplemental compensation plan under the
Guatemala Protocol. What the ultimate fate of that plan will be, I do not
know; however, it is my understanding of the current position of the
Government, that it is not intending to submit the Guatemala Protocol to
the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification unless some form
of supplemental compensation system can be established to increase the
amount available to United States citizens traveling on international air
transportation above the $100,000 limit provided in the Guatemala
Protocol. If this so-called private plan approach fails, obviously, the
Government will have to consider either dropping its intention to ratify
the Guatemala Protocol which, in my opinion, necessarily requires
denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, or the development of a
supplemental system through other means, such as legislation. Thus
as to the future, I can only say with the Apostle Paul, "For now we
see through a glass darkly."

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1973

7

Akron Law Review, Vol. 6 [1973], Iss. 2, Art. 2

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol6/iss2/2

8

